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Abstract 
When the topic of global governance or post-national governance arises, it gener-
ally does so in the context of the co-operation between nation states, international 
agreements and the role of international organizations. As opposed to this, global 
governance through the self-organization of transnational civil society is rarely 
discussed. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate the scope and limita-
tions of global governance through civil society self-organization. The case of the 
“Forest Stewardship Council” (FSC), which is now deemed a success, has been 
selected to demonstrate this phenomenon at work. What is involved here is a 
globally distributed environmental label for the certification of sustainably man-
aged forests. The FSC shows how a private civil society regime can be imple-
mented, how its implementation can be controlled and how violations can be 
sanctioned. It may be stated that the case of the Forest Stewardship Council is a 
form of global governance without nation-state involvement that can be viewed as a 
complete alternative to global governance through nation states.  
The rapid spread of the FSC system was enhanced by the dynamic combina-
tion of civil society self-organization with market mechanisms. Moreover, the FSC 
system fills a gap that arose from the political failure at the level of international 
regimes. However, it has become clear that national forest protection standards are 
needed for the FSC system to function smoothly. The FSC system cannot replace 
national legislation and its implementation by an effective administration. The fact 
that the FSC can rely not only on its own internal means of sanction (i.e. with-
drawal of certification), but can also resort to boycotts as a potential external 
instrument of sanction is undoubtedly a key factor behind the success of the FSC. 
However, the analysis also shows the limits of global governance through self-
organization: As no nation state has the norm-setting monopoly, the FSC system 
competes with other certification systems in many countries throughout the world. 
Overall, the FSC system can be deemed a success. Private standards appear to 
work best if a specific combination of self-organization and market mechanisms 
comes to fruition, if the non-state systems are embedded in nation-state systems, if 
resources are available outside the system that can, if necessary, be used to mobi-
lize consumers and if the problems that necessarily arise from the competition of 
certification systems can be overcome. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wenn von globaler Governance oder postnationalem Regieren die Rede ist, geht 
es zumeist um die Kooperation von Nationalstaaten im Rahmen internationaler 
Vereinbarungen oder um die Rolle internationaler Organisationen. Im Gegensatz 
dazu wird globale Governance durch die Selbstorganisation transnationaler Zivil-
gesellschaften selten thematisiert. Aus diesem Grunde will der vorliegende Beitrag 
die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen globaler Governance durch zivilgesellschaftliche 
Selbstorganisation aufzeigen. Ausgewählt wurde ein Fall, der mittlerweile als Erfolg 
gilt: das „Forest Stewardship Council“ (FSC). Dabei handelt es sich um ein welt-
weit vergebenes Umweltzeichen für die Zertifizierung nachhaltig bewirtschafteter 
Wälder. Der Fall des FSC zeigt, wie ein nichtstaatliches Regelwerk implementiert 
und seine Umsetzung kontrolliert werden kann und wie Verstöße sanktioniert 
werden können.  Bei dem hier analysierten Fall des Forest Stewardship Council 
handelt es sich um eine Form der globalen Governance ohne Nationalstaat, die 
durchaus als eine Alternative zur globalen Governance durch Nationalstaaten gese-
hen werden kann.  
Die rasche Verbreitung des FSC-Systems wurde durch die dynamische Kom-
bination zivilgesellschaftlicher Selbstorganisation mit Marktmechanismen beför-
dert. Darüber hinaus schließt das FSC-System eine Lücke, die sich aufgrund des 
Politikversagens auf der Ebene internationaler Regime ergeben hatte. Allerdings ist 
deutlich geworden, dass nationalstaatliche Standards des Waldschutzes nötig sind, 
damit das FSC-System reibungslos funktionieren kann, denn das Zertifizierungs-
system des FSC kann nationale Gesetzgebung und ihren Vollzug durch eine effi-
ziente Verwaltung nicht ersetzen. Ein Faktor für den Erfolg des FSC ist zweifellos, 
dass dieser Organisation nicht nur eigenes Sanktionspotential (z. B. Entzug des 
Zertifikats) zu Verfügung steht, sondern bei Bedarf auf Boykotte als externes 
Sanktionspotential zurückgegriffen werden kann. Die Analyse zeigt jedoch auch 
die Grenzen globaler Governance durch zivilgesellschaftliche Selbstorganisation. 
Da es hier keinen Nationalstaat gibt, der über das Monopol zur Normsetzung 
verfügt, konkurriert das FSC-System in vielen Ländern mit anderen Zertifizie-
rungssystemen. Insgesamt gesehen kann das FSC-System als Erfolg bewertet wer-
den. Private Normen scheinen dann am besten zu funktionieren, wenn eine spezi-
fische Kombination der Selbstorganisation mit Marktmechanismen zum Tragen 
kommt, wenn die nicht-staatlichen Systeme in nationalstaatliche Systeme einge-
bettet sind, wenn Ressourcen außerhalb des Systems zur Verfügung stehen, die bei 
Bedarf für die Mobilisierung der Verbraucher eingesetzt werden können, und 
wenn die Probleme bewältigt werden können, die sich aus der Konkurrenz von 
Zertifizierungssystemen zwangsläufig ergeben. 
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1. Introduction 
When the topic of global governance or post-national governance arises, it gener-
ally does so in the context of the co-operation between nation states, international 
agreements and the role of international organizations. As opposed to this, global 
governance through the self-organization of transnational civil society is rarely 
discussed. The first and obvious question posed by this concept is whether such 
governance, i.e. governance without state involvement, is even possible. Various 
studies have been carried out on the emergence of transnational networks and 
their significance in terms of agenda-setting and policy formulation.1 However, 
whether such networks are in a position to implement policies remains a largely 
open question, i.e. can transnational networks not only set, but also implement 
standards? 
This question constitutes the starting point of the following assessment of 
governance through network organizations.2 The aim of the analysis is to demon-
strate the scope and limitations of global governance through civil society self-
organization. 
The case of the “Forest Stewardship Council” (FSC), which is now deemed a 
success, has been selected to demonstrate this phenomenon at work.3 What is 
involved here is a globally distributed environmental label for the certification of 
sustainably managed forests. The FSC is a suitable subject for such a case study as 
its certification system existed as early as 1993 and it has spread to around 60 
countries in the intervening period. The rapid diffusion of this label is nothing 
short of remarkable and few other innovations in the area of environmental policy 
have enjoyed a similarly dynamic development.  
The distribution of the FSC label is based on a transnational multi-level 
organization, i.e. a highly institutionalized network organization with international 
and national offices and working groups, standard-setting processes on both inter-
national and national level and implementation and control processes at local level. 
The fact that decisions about the standards and their implementation are made 
                                                     
1 Cf. in particular the studies by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1999) on “advocacy networks” in 
international politics. 
2 Network organizations are referred to here in the sense of highly institutionalized 
networks with a long-term vision. Policy implementation services can only be expected from this 
kind of network organization. 
3 Cf. Kern/Kissling-Näf (2002) and <http://www.fscoax.org> (15 June 2003). 
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completely independently of the influence of nation states and international 
organizations is characteristic of the FSC process.  
In order to assist in the classification of the case study,  section 2 provides a 
brief account of the different variants of global governance. The next chapter 
(section 3) presents the FSC as an example of civil society self-organization.  The 
performance of the FSC, quantified on the basis of the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of the system,  is discussed in section 4.  Section 5 examines the effects of 
market mechanisms, state regulation and competing private systems for the defini-
tion and implementation of standards on the success of the FSC. And, finally, the 
scope of global governance through civil society self-organization is assessed in 
summary in section 6. 
2. Global Governance Through Transnational Network Organizations 
Three types of global governance are relevant in relation to the resolution of global 
problems. They are in no way mutually exclusive; indeed, they often present 
simultaneously and can complement each other. The three types in question are 
global governance through (1) international and intergovernmental co-operation; 
(2) global policy networks; and (2) transnational network organizations. 
 
Forms of Global Governance 
Type of Institutionalization Definition and Implementation of Standards 
International and 
intergovernmental co-
operation 
without self-organization through nation states 
Global policy networks with self-organization with nation states 
Transnational network 
organizations 
through self-organization without nation states 
   
The first type of global governance involves the resolution by means of interna-
tional and intergovernmental co-operation of transnational problems that individ-
ual countries cannot resolve through independent action, for example the destruc-
tion of the ozone layer or the difficulties surrounding greenhouse gases. This co-
 – 3 – 
operation often leads to the establishment of international regimes.4 In this case, 
the decisions are made by the participating nation states which then have to im-
plement the resolutions at national level. Thus, this form of global governance cor-
responds to the model of horizontal self-coordination between nation states com-
bined with corresponding (hierarchical) implementation strategies at national level. 
The second type of global governance involves global policy networks that 
have emerged in recent years and whose members include both state and societal 
actors. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) is an example 
of such a global policy network. International organizations, national governments, 
the manufacturers of vaccines, research institutes and NGOs have all joined this 
alliance, whose purpose is to protect children throughout the world against pre-
ventable illnesses through immunization.5 Global policy networks also involve a 
form of horizontal self-coordination within which nation states no longer domi-
nate, but merely represent a group of actors whose status is equal to that of inter-
national and supranational institutions, various NGOs and also subnational actors. 
Although the participants in global policy networks (may) belong to different 
political levels, their interaction in the context of negotiations is not based on any 
hierarchical structure.6  
The issue being examined here concerns the third variant of global govern-
ance, i.e. global governance through transnational network organizations.7 What is 
involved here is self-organization without the involvement of nation states.8 Thus, 
the primary focus of interest here are cases in which nation state actors are not 
involved in the definition of standards and whereby the system is implemented by 
the participating (private) actors themselves, i.e. a system of private standard-
setting is created. Along with the FSC, other examples of this phenomenon include 
                                                     
4 Cf. the classical definition coined by Stephen Krasner (1983: 2): “Regimes can be defined 
as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” International 
regimes have greatly increased in significance, in the area of the environment in particular; cf. for 
example Gehring/Oberthür (1997); Young (1997); Biermann (1998). 
5 Cf. <http://www.vaccinealliance.org>. 
6 On global policy networks, cf., for example, Reinicke/Deng (2000); 
Witte/Reinicke/Benner (2000) and Benner/Reinicke/Witte (2003). 
7 Cf. more recent studies on the emergence of a transnational civil society and transnational 
social movements (e.g. della Porta/Kriesi/Rucht 1999; Florini 2000; Smith/Johnston 2002; Rucht 
2002: 332 ff.). 
8 However, irrespective of the definition of their own private standards, transnational 
network organizations can participate in global policy networks and co-operate with state actors 
in this context. 
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the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)9 for the sustainable development of fishing 
and the Rugmark label10 for the prevention of child labour in the manufacture of 
rugs and carpets. While all of these cases involve new forms of governance (trans-
national regimes) in the economic sector, they differ significantly from the self-
regulation of the corporate sector which is generally described using terms such as 
“private international regimes” and “private authority”.11 These often involve 
“codes of conduct” under which the actual norm setting is left to the company 
itself, i.e. it is not controlled by independent third parties (cf. Cashore 2002: 514). 
As opposed to this, the FSC is a network organization whose emergence and 
development was predominantly supported by an environmental NGO, the World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). As transnational regimes of this type are (still) 
relatively rare, little research has been carried out on them up to now.12 
3. The Forest Stewardship Council as an Example of Civil Society Self-
Organization 
The FSC arose from a plan established by various stakeholders (including the 
forest and forestry sector, the timber industry, private certifying bodies, environ-
mental and nature conservation organizations, indigenous peoples) that had 
become involved in a WWF initiative in the area of sustainable forest management. 
FSC International was formally established as an independent and non-profit 
organization comprising 126 participants from 26 countries in Toronto in 1993. 
One year later a Managing Director was appointed and an office with three 
employees was opened in Oaxaca (Mexico). 
Although many environmental NGOs and numerous economic organizations 
were involved from the outset, in the public eye, the FSC was mainly associated 
with the WWF. Thus, the extraordinarily dynamic development of the FSC was 
enhanced by the fact that it could rely on the support of the highly professional-
ized organization of the WWF with its organizational units at national and regional 
levels. This played a key role with regard to the astonishingly rapid diffusion of the 
FSC label.  
                                                     
9 Cf. <http://www.msc.org> (06 June 2003). 
10 Cf. <http://www.rugmark.net> (06 June 2003); cf. also Wolf (2002). 
11 Cf. Haufler (1993, 2000, 2001) or Higgott/Underhill/Bieler (2000); the majority of the 
contributions in Ronit/Schneider (2000) and Hall/Biersteker (2002) concentrate on the corporate 
sector. 
12 Cf. in particular Cashore (2002), who also deals with forest certification, and O’Rourke 
(2003) and Wolf (2002), who analyze the social clauses. 
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In 2002, the FSC decided to open an “International Center” in Bonn. This 
involved the transfer of its international office to Germany and the conversion of 
the Oaxaca office into the regional office for North and South America.13 It was 
also decided to establish other regional offices for Africa, Asia and Europe. The 
purpose of the regional offices was to support national initiatives and certification 
processes in countries with relatively scarce national capacities (FSC 2003: 51). The 
intention behind this step in the direction of regionalization and decentralization, 
which can be observed in many transnational network organizations that have 
reached a certain size, was to structure the organization’s work in a more effective 
and efficient way (WWF 2002: 7 ff.; FSC 2003: 50).  
Between 1994 and 2000, FSC International developed ten principles and 56 
criteria (“Principles & Criteria” or “P & C”) for the forestry sector, e.g. regulations 
for compliance with national laws and international agreements (principle 1); for 
the definition of use rights (principle 2); for the protection of the rights of indige-
nous peoples (principle 3); for the protection of forestry workers (principle 4); for 
management plans (principle 7); and for the monitoring of certified forests (prin-
ciple 8).14  
These international principles provide a basis for the development of national 
and regional standards which constitute a central element of the FSC system. They 
are defined by national or regional working groups and must be recognized by FSC 
International before they can be implemented locally. The first national standard 
(for Sweden) was recognized by FSC International in 1997. National initiatives15 
currently exist in 31 countries and ten national and regional standards16 have been 
recognized in full or with restrictions (status May 2002; WWF 2002: 11). 
In the case of the national initiatives, the different forms of institutionalization 
are clearly differentiated. Firstly a “Contact Person” is nominated and then a 
“Working Group” is set up for the development of a national standard. Once the 
national standard is recognized by FSC International the “Working Group” 
becomes an “Advisory Board”. Furthermore, if the necessary resources are avail-
able, National or Regional Offices may also be established. 
                                                     
13 Cf. WWF Faktenservice Wald- und Holzzertifizierung Nr. 1, März 2003, S. 5. 
14 Cf.<http://fscoax.org/html/1-2.html> (15 June 2003). 
15 Cf. FSC Protocol for Endorsing National Initiatives <http://www.fscoax.org/html/4-
1.html> (29 July 2002). 
16 The countries in question are Belgium (with restrictions), Bolivia, Canada, Columbia 
(with restrictions), Germany, Peru, Sweden, Great Britain and the USA. 
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The FSC system is implemented by (private) certifiers which are accredited by 
the FSC and can act as certifiers throughout the world.17 The certifiers apply either 
the relevant national standards, if they have already been recognized by the FSC, 
or the international standards. In the absence of national standards, the certifiers 
adapt the international principles to the relevant national context. 
In terms of the effectiveness of the system, it is extremely important that there 
is a temporal limit on certification (i.e. five years).18 If violations come to light that 
are not rectified within a defined period, the certificate may be withdrawn.19 Possi-
bilities also exist for the issuing of sanctions.20 And in cases involving the serious 
violation of the rules, provision also exists for the actual withdrawal of FSC 
accreditation from a certifier.21 
The organization’s structure has had a positive effect on the success of the 
FSC system through which direct links between transnational, national and local 
decision-making, co-ordination and implementation networks are established. The 
FSC system was only able to spread so rapidly because it allows private standards 
defined at international level to be applied directly at local level. On the other 
hand, the definition of national standards is a more gradual process, however it 
guarantees — in the medium to long term at least — the consistent consideration 
of specific regional factors. Furthermore, its decentralized and regionalized struc-
                                                     
17 Hitherto, twelve certifiers have been accredited by FSC International: KPMG Forest 
Certification Services Inc. (FCS) (Canada); Eurocertifor (France); GFA Terra Systems (Germany); 
Istituto per la Certificazione ed i Servizi per Imprese dell’arrendemento e del legno (ICILA) 
(Italy); Institut für Marktökologie (IMO) (Switzerland); Swiss Association for Quality and 
Management Systems (SQS) (Switzerland); SKAL International (Netherlands); BM Trada 
Certification (Great Britain); SGS Forestry QUALIFOR (Great Britain); Soil Association 
Woodmark (Great Britain); Scientific Certification Systems (SCS) (USA); SmartWood Program 
(USA) <http://www.fscoax/html/5-3-1.html> (15 June 2003); of these twelve accredited 
certifiers, two are only authorized to certify the “chain of custody” and they are not authorized to 
certify forest management; the accreditation process is defined in detail in the FSC Accreditation 
Manual (FSC 2002). 
18 General requirements for the monitoring process are defined in the Accreditation Manual 
(Part 3.2) (FSC 2002). 
19 Cf. the general terms and conditions in the FSC Accreditation Manual, Part 3.1 (FSC 
2002). 
20 A situation that arose in Ukraine is an example of this: following the observation of 
serious violations of FSC regulations, the certifier (IMO) withdrew the FSC certificate from a 
forestry operation (ILMEST); cf. WWF Faktenservice Wald- und Holzzertifizierung, Nr. 7, 
August 2001, p. 3. 
21 The fact that this option is used when necessary is demonstrated by the fact that 
certification was temporarily withdrawn from the Dutch certifier SKAL; cf. WWF Newsletter 
Forestry and Wood Certification No. 10, April 2001; the general procedure is regulated in the 
FSC Accreditation Manual (Part 2.4) (FSC 2002). 
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ture ensures the FSC’s presence not only at international level, but also at national 
and regional level (national FSC initiatives and the “Forest and Trade Networks” 
of potential buyers which are supported by the FSC), and at local level (certifica-
tion through FSC-accredited certifiers). 
4. The Performance of the Forest Stewardship Council 
The key yardsticks for the assessment of the performance of governance through 
transnational network organizations are the effectiveness and legitimacy of their 
solutions. The FSC system can be deemed a success if the certified forest area 
actually increases and the transnational regime associated with the label is accepted 
by participants in terms of both its content and procedures. When assessing the 
performance of the FSC, it is necessary to make a distinction between the industri-
alized countries of the West, the transformation countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and newly industrialized and developing countries. 
4.1 The effectiveness of the system 
The effectiveness of the FSC system is demonstrated by the increase in certified 
forest areas and product chains. In mid-2002, ten years after the introduction of 
the label, there were certified forests in 57 countries and certified product chains in 
65 countries. 36.8 million hectares (ha) of forest are now (May 2003) FSC-certified 
(FSC 2003a). 
The first country in which 86,000 ha of forest were certified by SmartWood22 
in 1991 was Mexico. Mexico was followed by the USA and Costa Rica in 1992 and 
1993. In Europe, the role of the pioneer was assumed by the Netherlands (first 
certificate awarded in 1995), followed by Sweden and Poland in 1996, which were 
followed in turn by Great Britain23 and Italy in 1997. By mid-2002 between 30% 
and 77% of the forest areas in the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Ireland, Great 
Britain and Estonia had been awarded FSC certification. Progress in recent years 
                                                     
22 SmartWood is a programme of the Rainforest Alliance, an international NGO whose 
headquarters are located in New York. Although the programme was originally aimed at tropical 
forests, SmartWood is now active throughout the world, although its activities are mainly 
focussed on Latin America. The FSC was not established until 1993 and SmartWood applied for 
and was awarded accreditation of its certification programme in 1996; areas that were previously 
certified by SmartWood are also valid as FSC-certified areas <http://www.smartwood.org> 
(15 June 2003). 
23 On the development of forest certification in Great Britain, cf. Howell (1999) and 
Cashore et al. (2001: 23 ff.). 
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has been particularly dynamic, for example, in Canada, but also in some of the 
transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
The extensive involvement of the newly industrialized and developing coun-
tries in the FSC system is particularly remarkable. In mid-2002, approximately 60% 
of the countries with FSC-certified areas were not members of the OECD. The 
question as to whether this is due to the fact these countries are mainly affected by 
the threat of the logging of tropical forests, against which the FSC label is directed, 
is an open one. The fact that these countries export most of their timber and tim-
ber products and that certified timber is in demand on the target markets probably 
plays a crucial role here. 
The real success stories in the FSC context are the industrialized countries of 
the West as well as some of the transformation countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. For example, the certification of forests owned by forestry enterprises in 
Sweden has undergone a very dynamic development, in particular since the intro-
duction of the national standard. In June 2002, over 10 million ha, i.e. over 40% of 
Sweden’s total forest area, was certified. This corresponds to approximately one 
third of the world’s certified forest area. The development of certification in 
Poland, the first transformation country in which FSC certification was imple-
mented, was similarly dynamic. By May 2003, 64% of Poland’s forest area had 
been certified (cf. FSC 2003a).  
The differences between countries in terms of the size of certified areas can be 
explained at least in part by the differences in the prevailing property rights 
regimes. Countries that have relatively few private forests and small forest owners 
and, above all, large state forests (e.g. Poland) and large forestry enterprises (e.g. 
Sweden) are at an advantage here.24 80% of the certified Swedish forests are owned 
by the forestry sector and all of the Polish forests that have been certified up to 
now are state forests.25 
                                                     
24 One criticism of the FSC is levelled here: the owners of larger expanses of forest (in 
particular the forestry sector) have certain advantages within the FSC certification system as 
certification is far less costly for these companies than it is for the owners of small forests; on the 
problems faced by small forest owners when trying to have their forests FSC-certified and the 
possibility of group certification, i.e. the joint certification of forests owned by several small 
owners, a measure intended to alleviate this problem, cf. Scrase (2000). 
25 In the meantime, the forests in 13 of the 17 regional forestry directorates have been 
certified (FSC 2003a). In contrast to the situation in Poland, problems with FSC certification arise 
in Central and East European countries in which the state forests were privatized and 
preferentially transferred to small forest owners. 
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The extremely dynamic development of forest certification in Poland can be 
explained largely by the fact that Poland exports a lot of timber and timber prod-
ucts to Great Britain where the demand for FSC-certified timber is increasing. In 
general, this correlation also applies for developing and newly industrialized coun-
tries, however, markets for illegally logged timber still exist and these cannot be 
subject to state regulation. This phenomenon limits the effectiveness of the FSC 
 
Table 1: FSC-certified areas by country1 
Country Certified area in ha 
Proportion of total 
national forest 
area in % 
Proportion of 
worldwide certi-
fied area in % 
Average area per 
certificate in ha 
Sweden 10,130,310 41.48 34.58 440,448.26 
USA 3,887,704 1.83 13.27 40,923.20 
Poland 3,592,160 41.14 12,26 449,020.00 
Brazil 1,182,640 0.21 4.03 49,726.67 
Estonia 1,063,517 52.89 3.63 531,758.50 
UK 1,060,667 44.38 3.62 33,145.84 
Canada 1,000,920 0.41 3.42 90,992.73 
Bolivia 927,263 1.92 3.16 115,907.88 
Latvia 906,217 31.44 3.09 129,459.57 
South Africa 898,225 10.57 3.07 64,158.93 
New Zealand 610,258 7.74 2,08 55,478.00 
Mexico 516,404 0.93 1.76 24,590.67 
Ireland 438,000 76.84 1.50 438,000.00 
Germany 417,673 3.89 1.43 7,734.69 
Croatia 372,765 20.43 1.27 93,191.25 
Guatemala 312,461 8.13 1.07 26,038.42 
Chile 249,096 3,16 0.85 62,274.00 
Russia 215,715 0.03 0.74 71,905.00 
Indonesia 151,589 0.14 0.52 50,529.67 
Zimbabwe 110,561 1.27 0.38 27,640.25 
Netherlands 102,522 30.70 0.35 8,543.50 
.... ...    
Worldwide 29, 295,435 1.132  66,580.53 
1The table only includes countries in which more than 100,000 ha of forest has been certified. 
2Related to those countries in which forest area has already been certified. 
Sources: FSC International (http://fscoax.org); Certified Wood (http://certifiedwood.org); FAO 1999; author’s own calculations; 
status: July 2002. 
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system as demonstrated, for example, by the situation in Indonesia.26 Although 
pressure from export markets (in Europe and the USA in particular) in the late 
1980s and early 1990s prompted initial steps in the direction of the development 
of a timber certification programme, serious problems continue to exist with ille-
gally logged timber in Indonesia.27 Corresponding national policies and controls 
are required to protect the country’s forests and the FSC system cannot simply 
replace these state systems (cf. Murphy 2001a).28 
4.2 The legitimacy of the system 
As a general rule, it can be assumed that the legitimacy of non-state systems for the 
regulation of the economy is considerably enhanced by the direct involvement of 
NGOs (cf. O’Rourke 2003: 19). Thus, it may be assumed that, because it is based 
on a WWF initiative and operates with the involvement of the WWF, the FSC 
system enjoyed greater legitimacy from the outset than the “codes of conduct” 
created by the corporate sector. Moreover, legitimacy should be generated by the 
processes implemented within the FSC system, i.e. the international and national 
decision-making, co-ordination and information networks, on the one hand, and 
local implementation networks, on the other. 
Given that it was one of the aims of the FSC to strike a balance between eco-
nomic, ecological and social interests, it was agreed to grant equal voting rights to 
the representatives of the three chambers at international level (economic, envi-
ronmental and social chambers),29 i.e. in the General Assembly. Voting rights 
within the Board of Directors, which has nine members, will also be equally dis-
                                                     
26 10% of the world’s tropical rain forests and 60% of the Asian rain forest is located in 
Indonesia, 75% of whose territory is under forest cover. Thus, a transition to sustainable forest 
management would appear to be particularly imperative. 
27 It is estimated that 70% of the timber logged in Indonesia’s is felled illegally (cf. Murphy 
2001). It would appear that this even affects FSC-certified forests, which, far from increasing in 
Indonesia in recent years, are actually declining. One reason for this, for example, is that in 2001 
the certificate for the largest certified teak plantation in Indonesia had to be withdrawn after 
serious violations against the FSC regulations were observed (WWF 2002: 12); cf. also WWF 
Faktenservice Wald- und Holzzertifizierung Nr. 1, März 2003, p. 3. 
28 In 2002, a pioneering agreement was signed by the British and Indonesian governments. 
The aim of this bilateral strategy is to stop illegal logging and international trade in this timber and 
its products, WWF Faktenservice Wald und Holzzertifizierung Nr. 4, Juli 2002, p. 4. 
29 In April 2002, the FSC had 541 members of 60 countries, including individuals, 
institutions and companies. Of these, 46% were members of the economic chamber (e.g. Home 
Depot, OBI, IKEA), 36% belonged to the environmental chamber (e.g. Greenpeace, WWF, 
Friends of the Earth) and 18% were representatives of the social chamber (e.g. IG BAU) (WWF 
2002: 14). The social chamber was not established until 1996 when the environmental and social 
chamber was split; cf. also FSC (2003: 8). 
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tributed among the three groups in future.30 Furthermore, the representatives of 
the countries of the northern and southern hemispheres also have the same voting 
rights in all three chambers (Elliott 1999: 38).31 These regulations are remarkable 
because even when NGOs are guaranteed access to international negotiations, 
there is usually a clear imbalance between NGOs from the north and south that is 
not compensated by procedural rules (cf. Oberthür et al. 2002). 
Similar provisions exist for the national working groups which present pro-
posals for national standards to FSC International. Where possible, these standards 
are supposed to be defined on the basis of consensus within multi-stakeholder 
processes. The national working groups and committees also consist of three 
chambers (economic, environmental and social chambers) which have equal voting 
rights if voting is actually necessary.32 
In addition to the regulations concerning the FSC bodies, procedural provi-
sions have also been developed for individual certification processes. The certifi-
cation process includes the mandatory consultation of local stakeholders (von 
Kruedener 2000: 16).33 Complaint procedures also exist for (local) NGOs. When a 
complaint is received, it must be followed-up by the relevant certifier and FSC 
International only becomes directly involved if this action does not result in the 
resolution of the problem. The process can result in the loss of certification. 
The strong emphasis on participative processes has undoubtedly resulted in 
the FSC’s contribution to democratization processes in transformation countries 
and in newly industrialized and developing countries. With respect to the national 
level, this necessitates, however, that a national working group is established and 
national standards defined – a strategy that is emphatically pursued by the FSC, 
particularly in recent years. However, in terms of the individual certification proc-
esses, the situation at national level is of no consequence because the local stake-
holders must be involved in the process, even if no national standards have been 
                                                     
30 Hitherto, the economic chamber had only two representatives and was thus 
underrepresented; cf. Forest Stewardship Council A.C. By-Laws, No. 48 ff. <http://www.fscoax. 
org/html/1-1.html> (16 June 2003) and the relevant resolutions of the last General Assembly 
(Motion Statutory 5) of November 2002. 
31 In 2001, 73% of members came from the North and 27% of members came from the 
South (WWF 2002: 14). 
32 The consultation process for the development of the national standards is regulated in 
Chapter 12.4 of the FSC National Initiatives Manual (FSC 1998). 
33 Cf. the relevant provisions (No. 2.19) in the FSC Guidelines for Certification Bodies 
(FSC 2002a). 
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defined. This means that local NGOs are granted rights in the context of the FSC 
process that they are not even granted under the national legislation in many 
countries.  
Thus, overall it may be said that the FSC enjoys a very high level of legitimacy 
because the relevant stakeholders are involved in all decisions and the processes 
are relatively transparent.34 These effects are further enhanced as a result of the 
allocation of the certification and monitoring tasks to third parties.35 
5. Transnational Governance Through Civil Society Self-Organization 
New forms of governance between the market, state and self-organization are 
characteristic of the FSC system. First, the combination of civil society self-organi-
zation with market mechanism appears to play a key role in the success of the 
label. Secondly, the relationships between civil society self-organization and 
(nation-)state governance also appear to play an important role. The first question 
that arises here is whether an opportune structure for civil society self-organization 
was created as a result of the failure of the negotiations on an international forest 
convention. The second question that arises in this context concerns the comple-
mentarity of nation-state and non-state standard-setting and implementation and 
the interdependencies that exist between state and non-state standard setting. 
Thirdly and finally, the consideration of this issue must also incorporate the rela-
tionships between the different forms of self-organziation. These relationships can 
be explored, on the one hand, under the heading “certification in the shadow of 
mobilization.” What is also involved here is the competition between non-state 
systems of standard setting and implementation. While the international process 
did not lead to the creation of binding standards, it did, however, result in the 
development of guidelines and indicators for sustainable forest management. As a 
result, the basis was created for both alternative private regulatory systems of sus-
tainable forest management and for competition between the different certification 
systems. Thus, the next questions that arise concern the way the competing sys-
                                                     
34 On the requirements concerning the transparency of procedures, cf., for example, FSC 
(1998), No. 5.3. 
35 Despite the far-reaching processes, in reality, problems are not at all uncommon. A 
critical report issued by the Rainforest Foundation in autumn 2002 resulted in the adoption of 
measures for better quality control at the General Assembly of the FSC in November 2002, 
involving, inter alia, the improvement of current procedures for the suspension of certificates and 
processes for the management of complaints (e.g. from forest owners and environmental 
organizations); WWF Faktenservice Wald- und Holzzertifizierung Nr. 1, März 2003, p. 6. 
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tems have developed in the meantime and whether these different non-state sys-
tems of standard setting and implementation converge or diverge.  
5.1 Civil society self-organization and the market 
The FSC involves a form of governance through transnational network organiza-
tions based on the interaction between civil society self-organization and market 
mechanisms. The dependency on foreign markets, on which demand for FSC-
certified timber exists is crucial to the dynamic diffusion of FSC certification (cf. 
Cashore 2002). Thus, dependency on the export of timber products can lead to the 
introduction of and compliance with FSC-regulated processes in countries in 
which consumers have little interest in certified products, e.g. Poland. Hence, it 
may be assumed that rapid spread of the FSC label is due to the fact that there is 
considerable demand for certified timber and certified timber products. This 
demand has direct repercussions for the countries from which the timber origi-
nates.  
The WWF tried to intensify these repercussions through the creation of net-
works and thus established the Global Forest and Trade Network (GFTN), a 
platform for companies interested in the sale of certified timber products (Leuba 
1998: 8; cf. also Meidinger 1997: 52). The purpose of this network, which is inde-
pendent of the FSC, is to improve the co-operation between companies and 
NGOs. This meta-network currently comprises 19 national and regional36 “Forest 
and Trade Networks” which have members in 30 countries (e.g. in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Belgium). Three other networks are currently being 
established (in Bolivia, South East Asia and West Africa). There is a strong focus 
on Europe and North America within the GFTN as 14 networks are directed at 
countries in these regions. Almost 900 companies currently belong to these 
national and regional networks.37 They are the actual target group of the FSC.  
It is a basic strategy of the FSC System to mobilize market pressure to enable 
the formulation and implementation of a sustainability regime. The existence of a 
potentially politicized market among the consumers of timber products, i.e. furni-
ture manufacturers etc., is a necessary precondition for the success of this strategy. 
                                                     
36 Regional networks exist, for example, in North America and in Central America. 
37 Status: April 2002; the first Forest and Trade Network, the British WWF 95+ Group was 
established as early as 1991; 15 of the 19 networks only emerged, however, between 1997 and 
2002; Information Service of the Global Forest and Trade Network/WWF Sweden of 21 August 
2002. 
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The assumption that this kind of politicized demand exists constitutes the com-
mon basis for the companies and the WWF. What is important is that the consen-
sus about the objectives of sustainability depend not only on political-moral 
responsibility, but can also be associated with considerations involving issues of 
self-interest and competition. This does not mean that companies cannot assume 
ecological responsibility, but that an economic basis is undoubtedly an important 
resource when it comes to the stability and success of the self-organized regime. 
5.2 Civil society self-organization and the (nation) state 
Civil society self-organization instead of international regimes? 
The significance of these economic considerations was intensified by the failure of 
the planned international forest convention. The protection of forests was already 
a topic of debate at both national and global level in the early 1980s.38 However, 
the initial inter-governmental initiatives — for example the establishment of the 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)39 in 1986 — did not achieve 
the success that was hoped for. In 1989, several NGOs40 supported by the British 
government proposed a scheme for the introduction of a label for commercial 
timber from sustainably managed forests to the ITTO. When the ITTO failed to 
react to their proposal, the NGOs began to develop a strategy independent of 
national and inter-governmental organizations.  
It was during this period that the initial preparatory work for the foundation of 
the FSC also took place and the organization was eventually established in 1993. 
As early as 1990, a meeting between environmental and human rights organiza-
tions and representatives of the timber industry was held in California, at which 
the principles of good forest management and the need for certification combined 
with independent audits were discussed. This was followed by intensive consulta-
tion processes in ten countries for the purpose of gaining support for the concept. 
This initiative gained further impetus when efforts to adopt an international forest 
convention with the approval of the G7 states and the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
                                                     
38 A number of problems can be mentioned here: the logging of tropical forests, the loss of 
old tree stands in the moderate climate zones, the threat to the biodiversity and ecological 
functions of the forest and the inadequate protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. 
39 The ITTO is an international organization which involves countries that produce or use 
commercial timber. It has 57 members, including the EU, and its headquarters are in Yokohama 
(Japan); for more information, cf. <http://www.itto.or.jp> (16 June 2003). 
40 In particular, WWF International, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (Kiekens 1999). 
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Organization (FAO) failed at the UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.41  
The failure of the attempts to establish an international regime for forest pro-
tection gave rise to the opportune structure and upsurge in support for the WWF’s 
co-operative strategy. The FSC filled the gap that arose from the lack of co-opera-
tion between the nation states and assumed, at least in part, the functions of the 
forest convention through the combination of civil society self-regulation and 
market mechanisms.  
State standard setting and implementation as a prerequisite for self-organization 
Nonetheless, the non-state civil society regimes for standard setting and imple-
mentation in the FSC system remain dependent on state regulation in many 
respects. Firstly, the FSC system is influenced by national legislation. The legal 
provisions of the nation-state represent a kind of minimum standard that applies 
for all forest owners. The latter can then voluntarily opt to comply with the more 
stringent FSC standard, as compliance with this standard is associated with prom-
ise of advantages on export markets. Thus, more stringent national forest laws 
automatically lead to the raising of the national FSC minimum standard. In this 
respect, the combination of nation-state legislation and civil society FSC regulation 
can at best result in a “race to the top.”42 
Furthermore, can be assumed that a complementary relationship exists 
between state and non-state regulation. FSC certification, which is carried out on a 
private and voluntary basis, cannot replace all of the functions of the law. The 
private regime cannot function in the absence of a minimum level of state standard 
setting and implementation for the protection of the forest (cf. Wolf 2002: 205). 
Theoretically, the FSC system would manage without state support if it could 
seamlessly regulate the timber markets. However, this is not the case, and anyway 
such a scenario would probably be beyond the capacities of civil society actors (cf. 
Wolf 2002: 194; O’Rourke 2003).  
Thus, it is not surprising that the FSC system is more successful in industrial 
countries and in many transformation countries with extensive experience in the 
                                                     
41 Cf. WWF (2002: 8); on the failure of the international forest convention, see Humphreys 
(1996) and Hönerbach (1996). 
42 Problems only arise if the national standards in individual countries differ significantly as 
this can affect the national FSC standards — with the result that the national requirements for the 
awarding of the FSC logo can diverge strongly. 
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area of nature conservation and state management of forests than in developing 
countries where the logging of tropical forests may be illegal, but cannot be pre-
vented by means of either state regulation or international standards. The situation 
in Indonesia, where the FSC system has hitherto failed to halt illegal logging,  
demonstrates the limits of civil society self-organization. Thus, one of the FSC’s 
key aims, i.e. the protection of tropical rain forests, has not been achieved. One of 
the most important prerequisites for the functioning of the FSC system is lacking 
here: national standards for the protection of forests that are actually implemented 
by the state in question (cf. Cashore 2002: 510).  
5.3 The relationships between different forms of self-organization 
Certification in the “shadow of mobilization” 
From the perspective of those involved, the development of a timber trade that is 
completely independent of the state — at least formally — represents a change in 
strategy which constituted their reaction to the failure of all initiatives aimed at 
establishing an international regime (cf. Humphreys 1996: 149). From then on, the 
participating actors tried to compensate for the lack of co-operation between the 
nation states through self-organization and network building.43  
This strategy change was facilitated by a “division of labour” that existed 
among the different environmental organizations. Some of these organizations 
adopted a policy focused on protest, mobilization and boycotts. For example, the 
environmental organization Friends of the Earth organized a boycott against the 
import of tropical timber in Great Britain as early as 1984 (Elliott 1999: 162). As 
opposed to this, other environmental organizations (e.g. WWF International) 
expressed the view at a very early stage that the problems could only be resolved 
through co-operation with the local population as the logging of forests was often 
an expression of the difficulties facing the local populations whose existential 
needs were not being met (Dürrenmatt 1999: 2). Thus, from the perspective of 
WWF, instead of promoting boycott measures, what they needed to do was to 
develop new methods for the management of tropical forests with all stakeholders 
which would meet both ecological requirements and the needs of the local popu-
lation. 
                                                     
43 The case of the Rugmark Label, examined by Wolf (2002), can be assessed in similar 
terms. International agreements actually exist in this area. However, the conventions of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) are not observed, thus the civil society initiatives start 
where the ILO has failed (Wolf 2002: 209). 
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Nonetheless, consumer boycotts also played an indisputable role in this proc-
ess. The threat of boycotts was probably crucial in terms of the development and 
acceptance of the system by the timber manufacturing and trade sectors. The case 
of “Home Depot” in the USA shows just how essential such external pressure is. 
This leading global Do-It-Yourself chain has meanwhile become the largest trader 
in FSC-certified products in the USA44; however it did not do so entirely voluntar-
ily. The actions of the Rainforest Action Networks in organizing boycotts against 
Home Depot undoubtedly played a role here (Cashore 2002).  
Competing civil society regimes 
As a regime based on civil society and private self-regulation, and unlike state-
supported regimes, the FSC system cannot claim monopoly status. The “Pan 
European Forest Certification” system (PEFC) was launched in 1998/99 on the 
initiative of the forestry sector as a direct response to the FSC system (Gillon 2001: 
635 ff.; cf. also Kiekens 1999). The PEFC is directly linked to the Helsinki 
Process45 and the criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management 
adopted there. Like the FSC, it is also a reaction to the failed international forest 
convention. Moreover, the development of alternative certification systems is in 
no way limited to Europe. The situation in North America has followed a very 
similar trajectory (Humphreys 1996, 2001).46 
In May 2003, the total PEFC-certified forest area in Europe was 47.3 million 
ha; of this 21.9 million ha are located in Finland,47 9.3 million ha in Norway, 6.4 
million ha in Germany, 3.9 million ha in Austria and 2.3 million ha in Sweden.48 
Previously, significant differences existed between the two certification systems in 
terms of spatial distribution as, in the past, the PEFC system was limited to 
Europe. However, far-reaching changes are underway in this regard. The PEFC 
                                                     
44 Cf. WWF Faktenservice Wald- und Holzzertifizierung Nr. 1, März 2003. 
45 In the course of several ministerial conferences (Ministerial Conference on the Protection 
of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) staged inter alia in Helsinki in 1993 and Lisbon in 1998), 37 
European countries agreed on a definition of sustainable forest management and a system of 
criteria and indicators. This system is only implemented on a voluntary basis (Humphreys 2001a). 
46 Two other certification systems exist in North America along with the FSC system, i.e. 
the US Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) system and the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) 
system; cf. the comparative studies by Cashore (2002: 508 f.). 
47 On the criticism of the situation in Finland, e.g. of deforestation in PEFC-certified 
forests, see http://www.pefcwatch.org (23.06.2003). 
48 PEFC-certified forest areas also exist in the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Switzerland, 
Latvia and Great Britain; cf. <http://www.pefc.de/stand_zertifizierung/europa.phtml> (16 June 
2003). 
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has been engaging in co-operation with the North American systems since 2001,49 
and in November 2002 eight other national certification systems joined the PEFC. 
Thus, in future, the FSC and PEFC will be competing not only in Europe, but 
throughout the world.  
The PEFC is based on national certification systems and the mutual recogni-
tion of these systems. The PEFC criteria are less stringent than those of the FSC. 
They merely enact, in part, provisions already contained in the national forest 
legislation and give little priority to social and ecological criteria. The most serious 
differences between the two systems exist in the area of stakeholder involvement.50 
Thus, the FSC system should enjoy greater legitimacy than the PEFC system. 
Nevertheless, the PEFC is holding its ground and spreading throughout the world 
alongside the FSC label. Preferences with regard to the two systems in Europe are 
quite clearly divided: while the forestry sector prefers the FSC label, small forest 
owners generally opt for the PEFC system. 
The competition between the alternative systems will certainly do nothing to 
further the impact of the civil society self-regulation of sustainable forest manage-
ment. Thus, attempts have been made to alleviate the conflicts between the FSC 
and PEFC systems. To this end, for example, an informal working group was 
established in Sweden comprising representatives of the forest owners’ associa-
tions, the association representing the Swedish forestry sector, the Swedish nature 
conservation organization (SSNC) and the WWF Sweden. The working group 
published a so-called “bridging document”. However, it merely consists of an 
overview of the additional requirements that the PEFC-certified forest owners 
need to fulfil to obtain FSC certification and there are no plans to harmonize the 
two standards.51 
A similar situation developed in Switzerland. In autumn 1997, the forestry 
sector and timber industry associations created the Q-Label as an alternative to 
                                                     
49 FERN, an NGO specialized in the protection of forests, presented a comparative study 
on the following labels in May 2001: FSC, PEFC, US Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) and the 
certification system of the Canadian Standards Association (CSA). The report’s assessment of 
PEFC, SFI and CSA is quite negative (FERN 2001). Cf. also the report of the Meridian Institute 
(Meridian Institute 2001), in which the FSC system is systematically compared with the SFI 
certification system, and also the comparison of the FSC and PEFC by Sprang (2001). 
50 A systematic comparison between the FSC and PEFC systems was recently developed by 
a joint working group in Germany; cf. <http://pefc.de/vergleich/synopse_kurz.htm> (16 June 
2003); on the NGOs’ criticism of the PEFC system, cf., for example, Ozinga (2000). 
51 WWF Faktenservice Wald- und Holzzertifizierung Nr. 1, Januar 2002 and Nr. 2, Februar 
2002. 
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FSC certification as they feared that their economic interests were not sufficiently 
safeguarded by the latter (Stoffel 2000: 3).52 As a result, two competing approaches 
to forest and timber certification were established in Switzerland and the harmoni-
zation of the two is creating major problems. The Swiss Agency for the Environ-
ment Forest and Landscape (SAEFL) made a serious attempt to do this by adopt-
ing the role of mediator in the dispute and urging that general requirements be 
defined for both labels (“national standards for timber certification”).53  
Although the topics of mutual recognition54 and the harmonization of the sys-
tems now feature regularly on the international agenda, it is not expected that it 
will be possible to combine FSC and PEFC certification in a uniform system in the 
foreseeable future. The requirements that would need to be fulfilled for parallel 
certification are already being discussed in numerous countries. Thus, the more 
likely outcome is the co-existence of the two labels rather than their convergence. 
However, parallel certification gives rise to higher transaction costs than a single 
uniform label. Furthermore, it risks causing confusion among consumers due to 
the existence of competing timber labels. Even in the industrialized countries of 
the West consumers are not all that familiar with the two labels – not to speak of 
the differences between them (cf. O’Rourke 2003: 18, 22).55 Thus, the competition 
between the labels risks diluting the market pressure which is the ultimate lever 
that can be used to make companies comply with the standards of the certification 
systems. 
6. Conclusion 
In summary, it may be stated that the case of the Forest Stewardship Council as 
analyzed above is a form of global governance without nation-state involvement 
that can be viewed as a complete alternative to global governance through nation 
states. Standards for forest management are set and implemented by the FSC. The 
target groups must comply with these standards if they wish to be awarded the 
certificate and benefit from the economic advantages that come with certification. 
                                                     
52 The Q-Label, the Swiss variant of the PEFC label, is based on the Federal Swiss Law on 
Forests and the ISO 14.001 and ISO 9.001 standards. 
53 Cf. BUWAL Presseveröffentlichung, 16 February 2000 (press release available in German 
and French). 
54 On mutual recognition and the comparison of the different timber certification systems, 
cf. also <http://www.mutualrecognition.org> (23 June 2003). 
55 On the status of the familiarity of German consumers with the labels, cf. the study carried 
out by the Holzabsatzfonds (Heinze Marktforschung 2002). 
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The FSC shows how a private civil society regime can be implemented, how its 
implementation can be controlled and how violations can be sanctioned. 
The FSC’s solution to the problems regarding legitimacy that arise relatively 
frequently in the context of network organizations is remarkable: it was decided to 
award the same voting rights to representatives of the three chambers, both at 
international and national level. Furthermore, the votes of representatives from the 
northern and southern hemispheres carry the same weight at international level. 
This means that democratization processes can get under way, especially if national 
working groups with the same structure are created. Thus, economic globalization 
can not only lead to the sustainable management of forests, it can even contribute 
to the (more or less forced) diffusion of participative processes through which civil 
society is strengthened in the countries concerned. 
The rapid spread of the FSC system was enhanced by the dynamic combina-
tion of civil society self-organization with market mechanisms. Demand exists for 
FSC-certified timber and the corresponding timber products, particularly in highly 
developed countries. This affects transformation and developing countries as they 
mainly export their timber to these countries. Internal demand for certified timber 
and products manufactured from it in the transformation in developing countries 
is not generally a factor that could be expected to generate pressure for sustainable 
forest management. However, thanks to their export orientation, the FSC stan-
dards are nonetheless effective in these countries. 
The varying diffusion of the FSC label in the individual countries can be 
explained at least in part by the prevailing property regimes. Evidently, it is consid-
erably easier to certify large state forests and large forestry enterprises than to 
convince small forest owners of the advantages of FSC certification. Thus, it is 
surely no coincidence that Sweden and Poland became the pioneers of the FSC 
system. In Sweden, it was mainly forests belonging to forestry enterprises that were 
certified, while in Poland the certified forests were exclusively owned by the state.  
The FSC system fills a gap that arose from the political failure at the level of 
the international regime. However, it has become clear that national forest protec-
tion standards are needed for the FSC system to function smoothly. The FSC 
system cannot replace national legislation and its implementation by an effective 
administration. While corrupt and authoritarian structures cannot be compensated 
for or replaced by the FSC, in many industrialized countries the national standards 
act as minimum standards. Forest owners decided to comply voluntarily with the 
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more stringent FSC standards as they hoped to gain advantages over their com-
petitors on the markets.  
In the course of the establishment of the FSC system, the environmental 
movement followed a dual strategy that can often be observed in other contexts: 
on the one hand, some organizations threatened to stage consumer boycotts if 
necessary, while co-operation was entered into with the companies to establish the 
FSC, on the other. The fact that the FSC can rely not only on its own internal 
means of sanction (i.e. withdrawal of certification), but can also resort to boycotts 
as a potential external instrument of sanction is undoubtedly a key factor behind 
the success of the FSC. Mobilization and certification can, therefore, be viewed as 
complementary elements for the stabilization of civil society self-regulation. 
The FSC is a system of private and voluntary certification. Thus, it cannot 
prevent the emergence of alternative competing systems. This is where the limits 
of global governance through self-organization lie. The FSC system competes with 
the PEFC system in Europe, and meanwhile in many other countries throughout 
the world. This competition is proving problematic. It looks as though this will 
lead to a system of parallel certification which will definitely increase transaction 
costs and, perhaps, also limit the controlling effect of the labels on sustainable 
forest management. 
Overall, the FSC system can be deemed a success. At the same time, however, 
its success demonstrates the limits of global governance without the involvement 
of nation states. Private standards appear to work best if a specific combination of 
self-organization and market mechanisms comes to fruition, if the non-state sys-
tems are embedded in nation-state systems, if resources are available outside the 
system that can, if necessary, be used to mobilize consumers and if the problems 
that necessarily arise from the competition of certification systems can be over-
come. 
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